Home/Sectors/Defence & government
Maritime domain awareness AIS data with provenance built in at the receiver
A raw, verified vessel tracking feed from receivers we build and operate, made to sit inside your recognised maritime picture rather than beside it in another browser tab. Independent supply, so it can stand as the qualified second source your resilience requirement asks for.
100,000+
Vessels tracked / day
49M+
AIS positions / day
40+
Countries covered
<5s
Antenna to your API
AIS data for defence is unauthenticated at source
A risk score computed from a fabricated position report is a confident answer to a question nobody can check.

Any transmitter can claim any identityThe AIS layer under most maritime domain awareness work is open, unencrypted and unauthenticated by design. Anything able to transmit on the right frequency can claim any MMSI, any position, any identity, and the message carries no field that tells an analyst whether it was genuine. Analytics stacked on top inherit that weakness.
The case fails, not the detectionShadow fleet cases have been built, vessels detained, and then released, because intent could not be evidenced to the standard a court expects. It is the legal stage that breaks, more often than the detection stage, and interference makes it worse.
Same parent is not a second sourceConsolidation has concentrated commercial AIS in a small number of groups, which sits badly with programmes required to qualify a second independent source for critical inputs. We are a Danish company, independently held, running receivers we build and operate ourselves, which is the only basis on which a second source claim means anything.
coastal states jointly recognised GNSS interference and AIS manipulation as threats to maritime safety and security.
Joint open letter, Baltic and North Sea coastal states with Iceland, 26 January 2026See the footprint before you commitGive us an area of interest and we will show you what our own receivers actually collect there, with a sample of raw NMEA and the trust scores attached.
Request a capability briefingFrom dark vessel detection using AIS gap analysis to a case that holds

A qualified second source
Dual sourcing that is genuinely dual. Our receivers, our hardware and our supply chain sit outside the groups that now hold most of the commercial AIS market, so we can be carried as the independent second supplier rather than a second label on the same feed.
Raw NMEA into your own fusion stack
A raw NMEA AIS feed API for C4ISR integration, not another dashboard. Take it over TCP, as REST or as a WebSocket stream, or as SAPIENT compliant output, and fuse it with your radar, RF and imagery layers inside a boundary you control.
Dark activity and deception behaviour
AIS gaps, identity anomalies, implausible jumps, ship to ship transfers and loitering near chokepoints and cable corridors. Every position carries a trust score, so a suspect track arrives flagged.
GNSS jamming early warning
Every station carries a high-precision GNSS chip, so interference is detected at the receiver as it happens rather than inferred afterwards from odd vessel behaviour. That turns the network into an early warning system: when jamming starts in water you care about, you know while it is still going on.
Incident reconstruction from the archive
Undersea cable damage, a collision, a grounding or a search and rescue case. Pull the historical AIS data archive for the box and the time window, replay every track we collected there, and see which positions were trusted at the time and which were not.
EEZ surveillance and fisheries enforcement
AIS data for EEZ surveillance and IUU fishing enforcement, covering transponder shutdowns at the boundary, transfers offshore, and flag or MMSI changes between voyages, delivered with the reception record attached so enforcement teams can show their working.
How maritime domain awareness AIS data is produced, from antenna to API
Provenance is created at the point of reception, because it cannot be added afterwards.
Monitor
Our receivers, our network
Terrestrial and ship-borne receivers, every station running the same dedicated standardised hardware, with satellite feeds offshore. 100,000+ vessels and 49M+ positions a day across 40+ countries, collected by stations we operate rather than bought in from sources we cannot account for.
Verify
Encrypted at capture, scored on arrival
Each message is encrypted on the hardware the instant it is captured, and nanosecond time-stamped. Anomaly detection then apply a range of validity checks and attaches a trust score, so manipulated traffic is marked rather than quietly merged into a clean-looking track.
Act
Into the picture you already run
Raw NMEA over TCP, REST, WebSocket, or SAPIENT compliant output, under 5 seconds from antenna to your API. It feeds your recognised maritime picture and the analytics you already trust, and asks you to change neither.
Questions defence and government buyers ask
Is AIS data admissible as evidence in court?
Admissibility is a matter for the court, and we will not pretend otherwise. What decides it in practice is whether you can account for the record: where it came from, when, and whether it could have been altered on the way. Ordinary AIS cannot answer that, because it is an open broadcast with nothing tying a message to the receiver that collected it. Ours can. Every position we deliver carries the receiving station, a nanosecond time-stamp, encryption applied on the hardware at capture, and a trust score.
How do you detect AIS spoofing and GPS jamming in vessel tracking data?
Detection begins in the hardware itself. Our receivers carry anti-jamming and spoofing detection at the point of capture, and we run anomaly detection algorithms across the network in near real time. Positions that do not hold up reach you flagged rather than averaged away, so during a jamming or spoofing event you can see exactly what was affected instead of inheriting a cleaned-up track.
Is there an independent AIS data provider left after the market consolidation?
Yes. Worldwide AIS Network ApS is a Danish company, independently held, and outside the groups that have absorbed most of the commercial AIS market. We build and operate our own physical infrastructure rather than reselling another provider's feed, which is what allows us to be qualified as a genuine second source instead of a second brand with the same parent as the first.
Can the feed be delivered into an on-premise or restricted environment?
Sovereignty is the point. The feed is machine to machine by design, so it terminates inside infrastructure you control rather than in a vendor's browser session. It can be deployed onto your own servers, inside your own boundary, with the data resident where your programme requires it and no dependency on a third party portal staying up. Raw NMEA over TCP, a REST API, a WebSocket stream and SAPIENT compliant output to BSI Flex 335 cover most national and NATO-facing integrations. Tell us which interface your programme mandates and we will confirm what we support before you commit to anything.
How does verified AIS data integrate with an existing common operational picture?
As a layer, not a replacement. You keep your COP, your fusion rules and your analytics. We supply the AIS track with its provenance attached, so an analyst can see which of our stations collected a position and how it scored, while your radar, RF and imagery layers carry on exactly as they are. Running us alongside an existing feed is the intended pattern, with the traffic that has to be defensible routed through us.
Related sectors
Put a verified AIS layer under your maritime picture
Tell us your area of interest and your integration constraints, and we will show you what our receivers actually collect there.
Request a capability briefing


