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The alternative to Kpler for Subsea and Survey

Cable protection and survey teams typically begin an evaluation with the largest name in maritime data. This page addresses the stage after that, where an independent AIS data provider is assessed on its own merits and either earns a place on the shortlist or does not.

100,000+

Vessels tracked / day

49M+

AIS positions / day

40+

Countries covered

<5s

Antenna to your API

Who we are, and what we actually supply

The question that determines everything else is where the data originates. We operate the receivers, so every position can be attributed.

  • We supply a feed, not an application.Worldwide AIS Network ApS is a Danish company registered in Copenhagen under CVR 45911748, backed by Den Danske Maritime Fond, approved under the Startup Denmark scheme, and building with peaq. You receive the track and its provenance, in a form the alerting, risk models and claim files you already run will accept.

  • We own and operate the network.Terrestrial and ship-borne receivers, every station running the same dedicated standardised hardware, with satellite feeds offshore. Nothing is bought in or blended from a third party source, so any position over your corridor can be attributed to the receiver that collected it and the moment it arrived.

  • Suspect traffic arrives flagged, not smoothed.Each message is encrypted on the hardware the instant it is captured and nanosecond time-stamped, then scored by anomaly detection models. Manipulated traffic reaches you marked rather than absorbed into an apparently clean track. Delivery is raw NMEA over TCP, a REST API or a WebSocket stream.

Begin the evaluation over your own routeSend us a corridor and we will show you the raw positions our own network collects there, with receiver attribution, timestamps and trust scores.

Get AIS for your cable route

What to look for in an AIS data provider for subsea cables and survey

These are the questions worth putting to every supplier under consideration, ourselves included. They hold whichever provider you appoint.

  • Provenance of the data

    Ask what a supplier can establish about a single position over your corridor: which receiver collected it, at what moment, and whether the record could have been altered between capture and delivery. AIS is an open, unauthenticated broadcast, so provenance must be created at the point of reception and cannot be reconstructed afterwards. A cable claim turns on who was at the fault position at the approximate fault time, and a track from an unnamed source will not survive that examination.

  • Latency, and where it is measured from

    An anchor drag runs its course in minutes, so latency matters, but figures are only comparable when both endpoints are defined. Antenna to API is a different measurement from ingest to database, and both differ from the refresh interval on a screen. Ask each supplier to state their endpoints, then establish what your own work requires. Corridor alerting and a burial risk study have different tolerances, and procuring speed you will not use is a common source of overspend.

  • Coverage in the waters your route crosses

    Most cable faults occur in shallow, nearshore water, the band where satellite revisit is thinnest and terrestrial reception carries the load. Global vessel counts establish very little about a single corridor. Take the route as laid, select a window covering a busy season and a quiet one, and request what was collected there rather than a coverage map. Compare message counts, update rates and gaps for the vessel classes that carry the exposure, which for most cables means fishing and anchor handling rather than deep sea traffic.

  • Delivery formats and where the data terminates

    Establish early whether you are procuring a monitoring picture or a feed. If positions must reach your own alerting, your GIS, a CBRA model or a marine coordination desk, you need formats your stack can ingest directly, such as raw NMEA over TCP, REST or WebSocket. If the work happens inside a supplier's application, integration effort falls, and so does your control over the archive you may need years later for a claim or a route reassessment.

  • Independence of the infrastructure

    Consolidation in maritime data means two products can share a parent or an underlying source without that being visible externally. If your resilience case depends on more than one source over the same corridor, ask each supplier who owns them, whether the receivers are their own, and which parts of the feed are licensed in from elsewhere. Aggregating third party sources is a legitimate route to breadth. Owning the network is a legitimate route to chain of custody. Determine which your requirement demands, then procure accordingly.

  • How spoofing and silence are handled

    AIS can be switched off, an MMSI reused, a position falsified, and near cable infrastructure that behaviour is itself evidence. The question is not whether a supplier encounters manipulated traffic but how it is handled. Ask whether suspect positions are flagged, smoothed, or discarded before delivery. For cable protection, flagged is normally the requirement, since a marked anomaly over your corridor is a line of enquiry, while a cleaned track has removed the very thing under investigation. Ask what the detection rests on and whether the reasoning is visible to your analysts.

How we produce the data over a cable corridor

Our answers to the criteria above, in the order the data moves.

Monitor

Receivers we own and operate

Terrestrial and ship-borne receivers, every station running the same dedicated standardised hardware, with satellite feeds offshore, weighted towards the nearshore water where anchoring and trawling reach a cable. 100,000+ vessels and 49M+ positions a day across 40+ countries, collected on our own infrastructure rather than bought in or blended from a third party feed. That is what makes a second source over your corridor genuinely independent.

Verify

Encrypted at capture, scored on arrival

Each message is encrypted on the hardware the instant it is captured and nanosecond time-stamped. Anomaly detection then applies a range of validity checks and attaches a trust score, so a track that behaves impossibly near your route arrives flagged rather than averaged away, and the originating receiver remains attached to every fix.

Act

Into the tools you already run

Raw NMEA over TCP, REST or a WebSocket stream into your corridor alerting, guard vessel tasking and marine coordination, under 5 seconds from antenna to your API. The same feed sits beneath the tools you already operate and replaces none of them.

How Worldwide AIS Network compares.

The questions worth putting to every provider on your shortlist, ourselves included.

What to checkWhat to ask any providerWorldwide AIS Network
Where the data comes fromDo you operate the receivers yourselves, or buy and blend feeds from others?Our own independent physical infrastructure. Terrestrial and ship-borne, plus satellite feeds.
Provenance on each positionCan you tell me which receiver collected this specific position, and when?Every position carries its originating receiver and a nanosecond time stamp.
Handling of spoofingHow do you detect a manipulated or spoofed position before it reaches me?Anomaly detection models assess the validity of every position in real time.
LatencyWhat is the delay from reception to the data being available in my system?Under five seconds, antenna to API.
Delivery formatsWhich formats do you deliver, and will they drop into what I already run?Raw NMEA over TCP, REST API, WebSocket stream, and SAPIENT compliant output to BSI Flex 335.
Coverage where it matters to youCan you show me real data for my specific waters before I commit?100,000+ vessels a day across 40+ countries. Ask for a sample of your own area.
Running alongside what you haveCan I add you next to my current provider rather than replacing it?Yes. Running side by side is the intended pattern, not a compromise.

We have deliberately not filled in a column for any other provider. Coverage, latency and sourcing change, and a claim we cannot evidence is worth nothing under scrutiny. Put these questions to every provider you are evaluating and compare the answers directly.

Questions buyers ask when comparing providers

Can we run Worldwide AIS alongside our existing provider?

Yes, and that is the intended pattern. Few operators remove a working monitoring arrangement part way through a cable's service life, and we would not recommend it. Teams add an independent feed beneath what they already run, route the corridor traffic that has to be defensible through it, and leave the rest in place. Because we deliver a feed rather than an application, we sit as a layer beneath your alerting, which allows you to establish whether an unexplained gap over your route was a transmission gap or a reception gap. That distinction can only be resolved with two genuinely separate sources.

How much integration work does adding us involve?

It depends on the delivery route selected. If your alerting or GIS already consumes AIS as raw NMEA over TCP, you are repointing an existing ingest at a new endpoint. REST and WebSocket are routine integrations for a development team. SAPIENT compliant output to the BSI Flex 335 interface serves sensor fusion environments already working to that standard. We would rather scope the effort with your engineers at the outset than have it surface later in the programme.

How should we compare two AIS data providers fairly over one cable route?

Fix the variables before any demonstration takes place. Specify one corridor, one time window containing a busy period and a quiet one, and one set of vessel classes, then request the same extract from every supplier over that box. Compare message counts, update behaviour, gaps, and what each provider can establish about the origin of an individual position. Treat latency and delivery format as requirements rather than scores, since they are pass or fail against your own systems. Evaluated on that basis the differences become factual rather than presentational.

What if your coverage is thin over our route?

Then we will say so. The network covers 40+ countries and continues to expand, but no AIS network is uniform, ours included, and a cable route is a narrow strip rather than an ocean. Provide the corridor and we will show you what our own network collects there before any commercial discussion. If it does not meet the requirement, we are not yet the correct supplier for that stretch of water, and we would rather state that than work around it.

What does a CBRA need from AIS data that corridor monitoring does not?

A cable burial risk assessment, an MGN 654 navigational risk assessment for an offshore renewable project, or the shipping chapter of an EIA requires traffic distributions as a model input, with gaps visible rather than smoothed, since thin data understates anchoring exposure and produces under-burial that is paid for later in repair campaigns. A monitoring picture is built for the opposite purpose, which is why we supply positions carrying receiver attribution, nanosecond timestamps and trust scores instead of a cleaned track.

Past the comparison stage?

This page is written for teams mid-evaluation. If the requirement is already defined and you want the operational detail, our sector page covers AIS data for subsea cable protection in full: corridor and protection zone alerting, cable burial risk assessment and depth of lowering, MGN 654 navigational risk assessment and EIA consenting, damage investigation and claim recovery, and marine coordination through survey, lay, burial and repair.

Comparing options in another sector

Put an independent AIS layer on your shortlist

Send us the corridor coordinates and we will show you what our own network collects over your route. Compare it against whatever else you are evaluating.

Get AIS for your cable route